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JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, jurisdiction over this matter lies with the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ADDRESSED 
IN AMICUS BRIEF 
and 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue addressed in this Brief of the Amicus 
Curiae is the constitutional propriety the District Court's 
granting of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and denial of 
the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
The standard of appellate review in summary judgment 
matters has been succinctly stated by the Utah Supreme Court as 
In considering an appeal from a grant of 
summary judgment, we view the facts in a 
light most favorable to the losing party 
below. (Citations omitted.) And in 
determining whether those facts require, as a 
matter of law, the entry of judgment for the 
prevailing party below, we give no deference 
to the trial court's conclusions of law: 
those conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness. (Citations omitted.) 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield vs. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (1989). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
First Amendment, Constitution of the United States 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
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free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances. 
Article I, Section 4, Constitution of Utah 
The rights of conscience shall never be 
infringed. The State shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no 
religious test shall be required as a 
qualification for any office of public trust 
or for any vote at any election; nor shall 
any person be incompetent as a witness or 
juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of 
Church and State, nor shall any church 
dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall 
be appropriated for or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action began on September 26, 1991, when the 
Plaintiffs filed an action against the Defendants seeking to 
enjoin the Defendants from expending "any public funds, resources 
or property in support of prayers" at the Defendants' city 
council meetings and to enjoin the Defendants from "allowing or 
having prayers at City Council meetings." The Plaintiffs also 
sought a judgment declaring all past expenditures by the 
Defendants for such activities to have been in violation of 
Article I, Section 4, Constitution of Utah. The Plaintiffs also 
sought their costs. 
The proceedings below included exchanges of discovery 
information that led to cross motions for summary judgment. The 
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District Court issued a Memorandum Decision on March 2, 1992, 
which was subsequently followed by an Order Granting Summary 
Judgment on April 9, 1992, wherein the Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment was granted and the Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment was denied. The Defendants were thereby 
enjoined from allowing or having prayers at the Salt Lake City 
Council's meetings and from expending public funds, resources or 
property to support or encourage prayers. The Defendants were 
also ordered to pay the Plaintiffs' costs. 
A Notice of Appeal was filed by the Defendants on May 
1, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this Amicus Brief, and in light of the 
standard of appellate review which requires the court to view the 
facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below, the 
Amicus Curiae adopts verbatim the entire statement of "Undisputed 
Facts" in the Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record pages 192 through 203.) 
However, only those particular paragraphs referred to in the 
Amicus Brief, without footnotes or attachments, will be stated 
below: 
1. On March 4, 1895, as commanded by the Enabling 
Act, delegates from across Utah convened for Utah's 
final Constitutional Convention. The Convention was 
opened with a prayer offered by President George Q. 
Cannon of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints. (Proceedings, p. 9.) Over the next 66 days 
the delegates had 55 public business meetings. On 54 
of those days prayers were offered. At least 31 
assorted ministers, reverends and elders representing 
at least 14 different religious congregations gave 
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prayers. Two military chaplains, a lieutenant from the 
Salvation Army and 18 different delegates also led the 
Convention in prayer. (A compilation of the prayer 
information is attached and incorporated as Exhibit 
"BM.) Among the different churches represented in 
prayer were Methodist Episcopalians, Presbyterians, 
Lutherans, Mormons, Baptists, African Methodist 
Episcopalians, Unitarians, Scandinavian Methodist 
Episcopalians, Swedish Lutherans, Congregationalists 
and the just plain vanilla Episcopalians. (Memorandum 
in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
paragraph 2, Record pages 192 and 193. ) 
2. The Convention made it clear that the wide variety 
of religious faiths and other sentiments represented in 
their opening ceremonies was representative of the 
diverse beliefs of the community and the Convention's 
spirit of religious tolerance and freedom: 
MR. CANNON: Mr. President, I move the name of the church 
of which the reverend gentleman offering 
prayer is a member be inserted after his 
name, and I would like to request that this 
be done in each case since the opening of the 
Convention. I find by reference to our 
minutes of the first day, the name of the 
gentleman who offered prayer and also the 
church with which he is associated was given, 
and I think this should be done in each case, 
the obiect of the mover of the motion having 
been to show to the public that a freedom of 
religious sentiment prevailed in the 
Convention. 
Proceedings, p. 105. (Emphasis added.) (Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
paragraph 3, Record pages 193 and 194.) 
3. The first session of the State Legislature which 
occurred after the adoption of the 1895 Constitution 
(including Article I, Section 4) and admission of Utah as a 
State by the United States Congress, occurred on January 6, 
1896. Both the Special Session called to fix the date for 
the General Session, and the General Session itself, were 
opened with prayers. (See Journal of the House, pp. 16 and 
29, which are part of Exhibit "E" attached and incorporated 
by reference.) To the best of the City's knowledge, the 
practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has 
continued to this date. (Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, paragraph 13, 
Record pages 197 and 198.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: Legislative Prayer Does Not Violate The Constitution of 
the United States. 
In United States Supreme Court decisions over the last 
decade the right to conduct legislative prayers has been 
consistently found to not violate the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
POINT II; Legislative Prayer Does Not Violate The Constitution 
of the State of Utah. 
The Utah Supreme Court should go beyond the Federal 
Constitution and determine how Utah's Constitution affects 
legislative prayer. 
Utah's Constitution, as a document, is ambiguous in its 
treatment of legislative prayer. The drafter's intent should be 
reviewed. The drafters' behavior, which evidences their intent, 
was such that no absolute, unconditional bar to legislative 
prayer can be reasonably inferred. Instead, the drafters appear 
to have intended to create only an establishment clause 
protection. When this protection is applied to legislative 
prayer in city council meetings, no real threat that a state 
religion will be established exists and, consequently, 
legislative prayers should be allowed. 
Utah case law on this issue further supports an 
establishment clause protection interpretation, rather than an 
absolute, unconditional bar. This conclusion is further 
supported by reviewing Washington's interpretations of a similar 
constitutional provision. 
Finally, the absolute, separationist views of the 
Plaintiffs and the trial court go too far. Such a view would 
require a finding that anything religion based, such as Utah's 
Pioneer Day and Christmas Day holidays would have to be 
unconstitutional, because they bestow obvious benefits on the 
Mormon Church and on the Christian religion. 
Legislative prayers as conducted by Salt Lake City or 
any similarly situated city or town should not be found to be 
unconstitutional. They do not violate Utah's Constitutional 
establishment clause provision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Legislative Prayer Does Not Violate the Constitution of 
the United States. 
The United States Supreme Court has unequivocally ruled 
that legislative prayer does not violate the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Marsh vs. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983). 
The Marsh case involved the Nebraska Legislature's 
practice of beginning each of its sessions with a prayer, offered 
by a paid clergyman, who was selected by an agent of the 
legislature. A member of the legislature sued to enjoin the 
practice as violative of the First Amendment. The trial court 
ruled that the prayers were non-violative, but that payment of 
the chaplain from public funds was violative. The Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reviewed the entire matter and applied the 
three-part test of Lemon vs. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 
2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), and ruled that the use of the paid 
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clergy violated the Lemon test. The United State Supreme Court 
reversed this decision. 
In Marsh, Chief Justice Burger begins his analysis by a 
summary of the history of legislative prayer, as follows: 
The opening of sessions of legislative and 
other deliberative public bodies with prayer 
is deeply embedded in the history and 
tradition of this country. From colonial 
times through the founding of the Republic 
and ever since, the practice of legislative 
prayer has coexisted with the principles of 
disestablishment and religious freedom. In 
the very courtrooms in which the United 
States District Judge and later three Circuit 
Judges heard and decided this case, the 
proceedings opened with an announcement that 
concluded, "God save the United States and 
this Honorable Court." The same invocation 
occurs at all sessions of this Court. 
Although prayers were not offered during the 
Constitutional Convention, the First 
Congress, as one of its early items of 
business, adopted the policy of selecting a 
chaplain to open each session with prayer. 
Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment 
Religion Clause did not view paid legislative 
chaplains and opening prayers as a violation 
of that Amendment, for the practice of 
opening sessions with prayer has continued 
without interruption ever since that early 
session of Congress. It has also been 
followed consistently in most of the states, 
including Nebraska, where the institution of 
opening legislative sessions with prayer was 
adopted even before the State attained 
statehood. . . . 
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786-789. 
He then states that although historical patterns cannot justify 
contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees, they do 
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reveal the drafter's intent. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790. He finally 
concludes that 
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken 
history of more than 200 years, there can be 
no doubt that the practice of opening 
legislative sessions with prayer has become 
part of the fabric of our society. To invoke 
Divine guidance on a public body entrusted 
with making the laws is not, in these 
circumstances, an "establishment" of religion 
or a step toward establishment; it is simply 
a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely 
held among the people of this country. 
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. 
In the United States Supreme Court's most recent prayer 
ruling, Lee vs. Weisman, 60 L.W. 4723 (1992), wherein the court 
struck down the practice of prayer at high school graduations, it 
reaffirmed the constitutional nature of legislative prayers, 
wherein it stated as follows: 
Inherent differences between the public 
school system and a session of a State 
Legislature distinguish this case from Marsh 
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The 
considerations we have raised in objection to 
the invocation and benediction are in many 
respects similar to the arguments we 
considered in Marsh. But there are also 
obvious differences. The atmosphere at the 
opening of a session of a state legislature 
where adults are free to enter and leave with 
little comment and for any number of reasons 
cannot compare with the constraining 
potential of the one school event most 
important for the student to attend. The 
influence and force of a formal exercise in a 
school graduation are far greater than the 
prayer exercise we condoned in Marsh. . . . 
Lee, 60 L.W. at 4728. 
Legislative prayer, as practiced by the United States 
Congress, the various state legislatures and various other 
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legislative bodies, such as the Salt Lake City Council and other 
similarly situated cities and towns, is not violative of the 
United States Constitution. 
II. Legislative Prayer Does Not Violate the Constitution 
of the State of Utah. 
A. Introduction 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
reads as follows: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances. 
First Amendment, Constitution of the United States. 
The comparable, relevant portion of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah reads as follows: 
The rights of conscience shall never be 
infringed. The State shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no 
religious test shall be required as a 
qualification for any office of public trust 
or for any vote at any election; nor shall 
any person be incompetent as a witness or 
juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of 
Church and State, nor shall any church 
dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall 
be appropriated for or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment. . . . 
Article I, Section 4, Constitution of Utah. 
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It is apparent by quick comparison of both 
constitutional provisions, that the State constitutional 
provision is more detailed. This was also observed by Justice 
Crockett in a concurring opinion that interpreted this clause of 
Utah's Constitution, wherein he stated, 
It seems to me that this case should be 
decided upon the Constitution and laws of the 
state of Utah. It is to be noted that the 
provision of Section 4, Article I, of the 
Utah Constitution, which our decision 
quotes, is more articulate and express in 
assuring religious liberty and prohibiting 
discrimination, or church interference with 
private or public rights, than the generality 
of the First Amendment of the U. S. 
Constitution. 
Manning vs. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549, at 552, 553 (1973). 
In keeping with Justice Crockett's recommendation 
regarding the application of Section 4 of Article I of Utah's 
Constitution to questions relating to religious liberty, 
prohibiting discrimination, and church interference, this court 
should go beyond the Federal Constitution and look closely at how 
Utah's Constitution affects legislative prayer. 
B. Legislative Intent 
A logical starting point in the analysis of any 
provision of Utah's Constitution is to look at the drafter's 
intent underlying the questioned provision. 
This logical approach appears to be challenged by the 
Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs and trial court would have everyone 
believe that the language of the Utah Constitution is so clear 
that you need look no further. 
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However, even a cursory review of the Utah 
Constitution, with respect to the legislative prayer issue, leads 
one to question the clarity of the document. The opening words 
of the Constitution's Preamble are a prayer of thanksgiving: 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and 
liberty, we the people of Utah, in order to 
secure and perpetuate the principles of free 
government, do ordain and establish this 
CONSTITUTION. 
Preamble, Constitution of Utah. 
Yet, four short paragraphs later in Section 4 the 
Plaintiffs assert that there is an absolute, unconditional bar to 
legislative prayer. 
Then, Article VIII, Section 2(2)(c), grants churches a 
property tax exemption, which financially benefits them. 
There is some Utah case law that appears to require 
uncertainty in the Utah Constitution, before the framers' intent 
can be reviewed. State vs. Betensen, 378 P.2d 669 (Utah 1963). 
This required uncertainty appears to be present. While other, 
more recent, case law simply requires the courts to consider the 
framers' intent. P.I.E. Emp. Federal Credit Union vs. Bass, 759 
P.2d 1144 (Utah 1988). In P.I.E. the court stated: 
When interpreting constitutional language, it 
is appropriate to look to extrinsic evidence 
of the framers' intent, (Citations Omitted), 
including the record of debates during the 
constitutional convention (Citations 
Omitted). 
P.I.E., 759 P.2d at 1146. 
Looking to the framers' intent also allows the courts 
to use common sense. This has been stated as follows: 
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The constitutional provision must be given an 
interpretation which is sensible and 
realistic in its application to the affairs 
of life. To achieve that result it is 
necessary to look to the background which 
produced it and the purpose it sought to 
accomplish. 
Gammon vs. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc., 264 P.2d 417 
(Utah 1961). 
In order to discern the drafter's intent regarding 
legislative prayer, the court need not look far. The 
Constitutional Convention of 1895, met on 55 days. On 54 of 
those days, the delegates to the convention began their meetings 
with legislative prayers. Defendants' statement of Undisputed 
Facts, paragraph 2. The delegates also made it a point to have 
in their record a demonstration "to the public that a freedom of 
religious sentiment prevailed in the Convention." Defendants' 
statement of Undisputed Facts, paragraph 3. This statement, by 
the delegates, is an affirmation of their intent to have an 
establishment of religion protection clause, not a ban on 
legislative prayers. 
The practice of legislative prayer was carried on by 
Utah's first state legislature in 1896. On January 6, 1896, 
there were two sessions held, a special session and a general 
session. Both sessions opened with prayers. Defendants' 
statement of Undisputed Facts, paragraph 13. If the goal of the 
delegates was to stop all prayers in government meetings and not 
]ust to create an establishment protection, then why was there no 
objection to the new legislature's prayers? 
As the court will recall, the Marsh decision, was 
based, in part, upon the long-standing practice of allowing 
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legislative prayers, the history of said practice being cited at 
length in Marsh. 
In the case now before the court, the legislative body 
is not the state legislature, but a city's legislature, i.e., a 
city council. There is no case law known, wherein a city or town 
has been forbidden to begin its meetings with legislative prayer, 
in a state that allows its legislature to begin its sessions with 
legislative prayer. There is no logical or justifiable reason to 
treat the state legislature any different than a city 
legislature. 
The purpose of Section 4 was to incorporate an 
establishment clause protection into Utah's Constitution, and not 
to implement an absolute, unconditional bar to religious 
exercises, such as legislative prayers. 
Just as was done in Marsh, the court should look at 
whether having allowed legislative prayer in Utah for the last 96 
years has led to the establishment of a state religion. It is 
common knowledge that the membership of the state's majority 
religion, as a percent of the whole state's population, is 
declining. In short, the establishment clause protection 
provided by Section 4, with the exception for legislative prayers 
as has existed for the last 96 years, is working. As Justice 
Goldberg stated in his concurring opinion in Abinqton School 
District vs. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 
(1963), which was cited favorably in Marsh, 
. . . the measure of constitutional 
adjudication is the ability and willingness 
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to distinguish between real threat and mere 
shadow. 
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795. 
Where is the "real threat"? It has not been proven by 
the Plaintiffs. 
The delegates to Utah's Constitutional Convention had 
no intent to stop legislative prayer when they drafted a detailed 
establishment clause. Their only intent was to create a workable 
establishment clause protection for the citizens of Utah. That 
goal has been accomplished. There is no "real threat" through 
continued legislative prayers. The trial court's ruling against 
legislative prayer in the Salt Lake City Council 
meetings should be overturned and the practice of legislative 
prayer in those meetings found to be Constitutional. 
C. Relevant Utah Case Law Interpretations 
There is no Utah decision that has previously 
interpreted Section 4's establishment clause protection in a 
situation specifically involving legislative prayer. There are, 
however, four Utah cases that offer the court some assistance in 
interpreting Section 4. 
In each of these cases, the court has treated Section 4 
as an establishment clause protection and not as an absolute 
prohibition of all religious involvement in a government setting. 
The oldest case is Gubler vs. Utah State Teachers' 
Retirement Board, 192 P.2d 580 (1948), wherein the Utah Supreme 
Court found no violation of Section 4. The claim was that 
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Section 4 had been violated because certain teachers that had 
taught eight years earlier at church run schools were to be 
allowed increased state retirement fund benefits because of their 
years of teaching at parochial schools. Thus, the teachers would 
receive money from the state for their past religious based 
activities. The court affirmed the State's retirement fund plan, 
finding no breaches of the wall between church and state. 
Gubler, 192 P.2d at 587. 
Gubler was followed a year later by Thomas vs. 
Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 197 P.2d 477 (1948), wherein four of 
the five justices of Utah's Supreme Court found no violation of 
Section 4, while one did find a violation. In Thomas. the 
legislature leased a portion of the state capitol grounds to an 
organization known as the Daughters of Utah Prioneers and 
provided $150,000.00 to the organization for the construction of 
a museum that would display Mormon artifacts and portray the 
history of the Mormon Chruch in Utah. Although the justices did 
not couch their language in establishment clause terms as they 
reviewed Section 4, they clearly expressed establishment clause 
concerns. 
There was no bright line, absolutist rule adopted by 
the court as a whole or by any of its individual members. The 
key for Justice Pratt was whether there was evidence by the 
society of proselyting activity. Thomas, 197 P.2d at 490. He 
concluded there was not; therefore, the lease and money were not 
a violation of Section 4. Chief Justice McDonough agreed with 
Justice Pratt, because he could find no evidence of the 
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organization being involved in propagating the Mormon faith. 
Thomas, 197 P.2d at 496. Justice Latimer agreed with Justice 
Prattf while Justice Wade agreed with Justices McDonough and 
Latimer. Thomas, 197 P.2d at 498 and 508. 
Justice Wolfe dissented because the members of the 
Daughters might be tempted to carry out an express purpose of the 
Mormon faith, i.e., to propagate the religion. Thomas, 197 P.2d 
at 516. 
The next interpretation of this subject matter was by 
the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit in Anderson vs. 
Salt Lake City Corporation, 475 F.2d 29, Cert, denied 414 U.S. 
879, 94 S.Ct. 50, 38 L.Ed.2d 124 (1973). This case involved a 
request by the Fraternal Order of Eagles to place a permanent, 
granite monolith on City and County property, which contained the 
Ten Commandments and various other religious symbols. The City 
Commissioners thereafter authorized the installation and 
maintenance of lighting equipment to illuminate and enhance the 
display, which would cost a nominal amount of money to operate 
and maintain. 
The court went through a lengthy establishment clause 
analysis and concluded as follows: 
The wholesome neutrality guaranteed by 
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 
does not dictate obliteration of all our 
religious traditions. . . . Although an 
accompanying plaque explaining the secular 
significance of the Ten Commandments would be 
appropriate in a constitutional sense, we 
cannot say that the monument, as it stands, 
is more than a depiction of a historically 
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important monument with both secular and 
sectarian effects. 
No one can be the judge of his own 
objectivity. It may well be that in this 
blurred, indistinct area of our national life 
and environment, opinions about the purpose 
and effect of the monolith are influenced by 
orthodox or unorthodox propensities. But be 
that as it may, we are brought to the 
conclusion that the monolith is primarily 
secular, and not religious in character; that 
neither its purpose or effect tends to 
establish religious belief. 
Anderson, 475 F.2d at 34. 
The fourth case has been referenced earlier, Manning 
vs. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549 (1973), wherein the Utah Supreme 
Court allowed Sevier County and Richfield City to bond for the 
purchase of land for and construction of a hospital to be 
operated by an entity controlled by of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints. There was no dispute that the County and 
City were bestowing a financial benefit on the operator of the 
hospital. The Supreme Court, while directly addressing Section 
4, concluded that the plan "carefully avoided excessive religious 
entanglements." Manning, 517 P.2d at 552. The court concluded 
that all but one aspect of the plan was constitutional. 
All four of these cases are treated by the courts as 
establishment clause cases. No case in Utah establishes a bright 
line, absolutist view regarding Section 4, as was proposed by the 
Plaintiffs and adopted by the trial court in this case. All four 
afforded the citizens of the State of Utah with protection from 
the establishment of a state religion, while not forbidding all 
involvement by the state or its statutorily created governmental 
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units from all involvement with religion. 
All four involved the bestowal of some amount of 
financial benefit on members of a church, on a church, on 
religion in general, or on a church run hospital. This bestowal 
of some amount of financial benefit at first glance may appear to 
contradict the "No public money or property shall be 
appropriated" language of Section 4. However, when the entire 
Constitution is reviewed, including the words of the Preamble and 
Article VIII, in light of its legislative history, then there is 
no contradiction. 
The bestowal of some small amount of financial benefit 
by the Salt Lake City Council in order to begin its meetings with 
prayer is not unconstitutional. The use of a minute or two of 
time; the use of a podium; or the use of a pre-arranged schedule 
as to who will pray or offer a thought according to non-sectarian 
guidelines, are not unconstitutional. They are not a "real 
threat" to the rights of Utah's citizens any more than there was 
a real threat in the four Utah cases that have just been 
reviewed. 
The trial court's absolutist ruling against legislative 
prayer in the Salt Lake City Council's meetings or in the 
meetings of any other Utah city or town should be reversed. 
D. Relevant Washington Case Law Interpretation 
Washington State's Constitution contains an 
establishment clause that is similar to Section 4 of Article I 
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of Utah's Constitution. It reads as follows: 
"Absolute freedom of conscience in all 
matters of religious sentiment, belief, and 
worship, shall be guaranteed to every 
individual, and no one shall be molested or 
disturbed in person, or property, on account 
of religion; but the liberty of conscience 
hereby secured shall not be so construed as 
to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify 
practices inconsistent with the peace and 
safety of the state. No public money or 
property shall be appropriated for, or 
applied to any religious worhsip, exercise or 
instruction, or the support of any religious 
establishment. No religious qualification 
shall be required for any public office, or 
employment, nor shall any person be 
incompetent as a witness, or juror, in 
consequence of his opinion on matters of 
religion, nor be questioned in any court of 
justice touching his religious belief to 
affect the weight of his testimony." 
Article I, Section 11, Constitution of Washington. 
There is no Washington decision that has previously 
interpreted Washington's Section 11 establishment clause 
protection in a situation involving legislative prayer. There 
are a few Washington cases that address the issue of state 
payments for religious instruction. 
In the Washington religious instruction cases, the 
courts have not treated Washington's Section 11 as an absolute 
prohibition provision. Instead, they have chosen to treat it in 
an establishment clause fashion, offering reasonable protection 
to the state's citizens, which treatment conforms with Utah's 
past treatment of Utah's constitutional provision. 
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The most recent case in Washington is Witters vs. State 
Com'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989). The Witters 
case began in 1979, when Mr. Witters was denied financial 
assistance for his education, which was to be conducted at a 
Christian school with a course of study that would prepare him 
for a career as a pastor, missionary or youth director. Witters, 
771 P.2d at 1120. The case found its way to the United States 
Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded the matter, concluding 
that direct financial assistance to an individual did not violate 
the Federal Constitution pursuant to the Lemon vs. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), but that it 
needed to be reviewed in light of the "far stricter" Washington 
State Constitution. 474 U.S. 481, 489, 88 L.Ed.2d 846, 106 S.Ct. 
748 (1986). 
On remand, the Supreme Court of Washington found that 
the denial of financial aid to fund an individual's religious 
education was the Constitutional course. The key issue being 
that Mr. Witters was seeking to have the State pay for "religious 
instruction," instruction that was devotional in nature and 
designed to induce faith and belief in the student. The court 
ruled that that activity violated Washington's Section 11 
prohibition against appropriation for and application to public 
money for religious instruction. Witters, 111 P.2d at 1122. 
Witters court relied on two earlier Washington cases. 
In State ex rel Dearie vs. Frazier, 173 P. 35 (Wash. 1918), the 
Washington Supreme Court would not allow a school board to give 
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high school credits for Bible study done outside of school. In 
Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church vs. Board of Regents, 436 P.2d 
189, Cert, denied 393 U.S. 960, 89 S.Ct. 398, 21 L.Ed.2d 372 
(1968), the Washington Supreme Court allowed a state university 
to teach an English course that reviewed the Bible as literature. 
The most crucial portion of the court's analysis is the 
following: 
There can be no doubt that our 
constitutional bars are absolute against 
religious instruction and indoctrination in 
specific religious beliefs or dogma; but they 
do not proscribe open, free, critical, and 
scholarly examination of the literature, 
experiences, and knowledge of mankind. 
Calvary, 436 P.2d at 193. 
The key to Washington's analysis comes through the 
question in Calvary that asks if the activity is "religious 
instruction or indoctrination in specific religious beliefs or 
dogma?" Calvary, 436 P.2d at 193, and Witters, 771 P.2d at 1122. 
If the answer is yes, then the activity is constitutionally 
forbidden. Otherwise, there is no "absolute bar." 
Applying this test to legislative prayer as was 
conducted in the Constitutional Convention in Utah to the 
Preamble to Utah's Constitution, to legislative prayers in our 
present state legislature, to the Salt Lake City Council on the 
date the present action was filed, to the Salt Lake City Council 
once its written policy was adopted, and to any other similarly 
situated city or town in Utah, the answer is no. 
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E. Other Utah Religious Activities 
The State of Utah, along with its cities and towns, 
participates in other religious activities that an absolute 
separationist view should find unconstitutional. These 
activities all bestow some amount of financial benefit on 
religion, which in the Plaintiffs' view should require a finding 
of unconstitutionality. 
Pioneer Day, July 24th, is by statute, a legal holiday. 
Section 63-13-2, Utah Code Annotated as amended. As Utah's 
"statehood" or "discovery" or "settlement" day, it does not fall 
on the dates that Utah joined the union, that Utah was discovered 
by the colonial powers, or that the first pioneers came into the 
Salt Lake Valley, July 22, 1847. Instead, the legal holiday 
recognizes the day that the Mormon Prophet came into the Salt 
Lake Valley and declared, "This is the right place," which 
statement arose from his earlier having seen the Salt Lake Valley 
in a vision. 
An absolutist view of Section 4 must clearly require 
Utah to not celebrate a Mormon phophet's confirmation of a 
vision. However, Pioneer Day has not been challenged. 
Christmas Day, December 25th, is likewise by statute a 
legal holiday. Section 63-13-2, Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
This day is the day that the Christian religion in general 
celebrates the birth of its Savior, its most sacred day of the 
year. 
An absolutist view of Section 4 must clearly require 
Utah to not celebrate the Christian religion's most sacred day of 
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the year. However, Christmas has not been challenged. 
Each of these holiday examples bestowes obvious 
benefits on the Mormon religion or on the Christian religion. It 
does not make sense to claim that those ecclesiastical 
organizations are not financially benefited by the government's 
acceptance of their religious events as legal holidays. However, 
no one is claiming that the state is in violation of its 
Constitution by observing these two religious holidays. 
The absolutist view proposed by the Plaintiffs and 
adopted by the trial court should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Article I, Section 4, of Utah's Constitution was never 
intended to be an absolute, unconditional bar to legislative 
prayers in Salt Lake City's council meetings or in any other Utah 
city or town. The drafters of Utah's Constitution made 
legislative prayer a part of their actions. There is no reason 
to believe that the drafters intended anything more by Section 4 
than to provide Utah citizens with reasonable establishment 
clause protection. 
Utah's past case law interpretation supports this view, 
just as does the State of Washington's past case law 
interpretations of a similar constitutional provision. The 
absolutist approach proposed by the Plaintiffs would lead to 
unacceptable restrictions, which were definitely not intended by 
the drafters and are not necessary to protect the rights of 
Utah's citizens. 
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The ruling of the District Court should be reversed. 
The Court should find against the Plaintiffs and for the 
Defendants. Legislative prayer at city council meetings should 
be found to be 3 constitutionally allowed activity. 
DATED this 18th day of August, 1992. 
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